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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper considers, in a series of reflections, how 
existentialist philosophy might be used to inform the 
teaching and management of the traditionally 
conceptualized and conventionally elective “soft” courses 
of Accounting Theory, Business Ethics and Sustainability. 
The purpose is to explore the locations from which the 
teaching of accounting might offer critical evaluation on 
the interactions of the individual (for example, student 
and teacher) and society (for example, employment as 
“an accountant” in business, the profession and 
academia).  
The paper is structured as follows. In this section I 
reflect on and draw implications for the emancipatory 
aspects of the teaching of accounting. A following section 
explores the existentialist ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. I place focus 
on the Nietzschean concept of “bad conscience”, the 
Sartrean concept of “bad faith”, and whether de 
Beauvoir‟s “almost Kantian” ethics should be 
conceptualized as existentialist. Existentialist song lyrics 
by the important “first wave of punk” band The Clash are 
also considered. The songs studied are “London Calling” 
(1979) and “Stay Free” (1978) (The use of musical 
metaphors in accounting and business research 
continues the research current established in James 
(2009a, 2009b, 2010). More importantly though, might we 
reflect on how music, not the reading of it as much as the 
auditory aspects, be combined with critical perspectives 
on the teaching of accounting). In my discussion of “Stay 
Free” we consider whether working-class empathy-
compassion can rightfully be said to be an “existentialist 
ethics” or whether the lyricist Mick Jones of the Clash 
simply “bolts it on” to the existentialism themes in “Stay 
Free”. I aim to consider whether there is such a thing as 
existentialist ethics. This question is revisited in our 
discussion of Simone de Beauvoir‟s writings. At the tail-
end of Section 2 I go on to consider Bauman‟s (1976) 
important argument that existentialism is forever an 
incomplete worldview from the standpoint of critical 
sociology. I then in Section 3 derive practical implications 
of existentialist philosophy for accounting educators.  
In this introductory section I recount and draw 
implications for the emancipatory aspects of the teaching 
of accounting from a moving piece of sports journalism. 
The article, rooted in and never departing from an 
interview with a sportsperson, managed to transcend 
sport in its description of a life lived in line with the 
existentialist ideas of anguish, choice, action, re-creation 
and redemption. Given that Australian rugby league had 
transformed into a business by the 1970s, this story also  
  
 
 
 
 
transcends business. The story is a message of someone 
receiving what Christians call God‟s grace and finding 
inward peace. God‟s grace, or as McKernan and 
Kosmala (2007) prefer to put it the “religious impulse”, is 
something that we need as a society to hang on to, so 
that it can continue to shed its light even in the dark, 
mechanistic capitalist world of modern accounting. 
Alongside practitioners and teachers, accounting 
students are also in need of the religious impulse lest we 
merely teach them how to enforce capitalist-created 
alienation upon their future employees (Boyce, 2008; 
Bryer, 2006; Eagleton, 1997; Tinker, 1999) in what 
Foucault (1977) has termed the “carceral city” and 
“carceral archipelago” of modern disciplining and 
normalizing institutions. 
Sometime in the mid-1980s or thereabouts, Australia‟s 
Rugby League Week provided an exclusive interview with 
one Paul Hayward, a player who had played several 
years of enthusiastic, exciting football with Sydney‟s 
Newtown Jets in the 1970s (Williams, 1993, pp. 92, 95). 
An unusual aspect of the interview is that it was 
conducted within the oppressive environment of a Thai 
jail, where Hayward at the time was held after receiving a 
life sentence for drug-trafficking offences. In the official 
history book of the Newtown Jets Rugby League club Out 
of the Blue, Williams (1993, p. 95) labels Hayward a 
“tragic figure”, adding that Hayward‟s name was “later 
tainted by his involvement in a drug-smuggling scandal 
which saw him serve a lengthy prison term in Thailand”. 
The 1980s RLW interview takes a surprising turn when 
Hayward reveals that he had found God and become an 
evangelical Christian whilst in prison. Hayward speaks as 
a man who had reconciled himself to his circumstances 
and who had found inner peace. Although clearly the 
interview was prompted by Hayward‟s position as an ex-
rugby league star, it was evident that rugby league to 
Hayward had become a far-away, distant and 
unimportant world. Somehow, when reading the article, 
sport seemed less important, less able to put a claim on 
us. Big business, the force that rules the modern day top-
tier sporting competitions around the world, had also lost 
its power. Hayward had experienced what he perceived 
to be God‟s grace, the name Christians give for what they 
perceive to be His undeserved favour. 
Williams‟ (1993) above-cited throw-away line about 
Hayward seems a casual, thoughtless attempt by a 
moralizer to capture and describe this wild man‟s 
essence. In G. K. Chesterton‟s (2007) words, the 
Christian values of faith, hope, and charity defy logic 
since faith believes in the unseen, hope is only necessary 
when circumstances are hopeless, and charity is shown 
to the undeserving. Hayward‟s life has followed an 
existentialist path: he has lived his life fully by choosing 
rather than by accepting as essence any pre-ordained 
view of one‟s role within the world. Hayward‟s first life-
choice was playing rugby league for Newtown; secondly, 
after retirement from rugby league, he re-created himself  
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by performing a risky drug-smuggling operation; when 
serving time in the Thai jail for drug-smuggling, he then 
re-created and re-defined himself for the second time, 
this time as an evangelical Christian keen to put his 
chequered past behind him. Clearly Hayward‟s drug-
smuggling episode had cancelled out in many people‟s 
minds the favourable impact that Hayward had created 
through his rugby league. As Jean-Paul Sartre (2003) 
makes clear in his definitive work Being and Nothingness, 
other people continually attempt to define and re-define 
our essence according to their own objectives and 
preferences.  At death (and to a lesser extent while in 
jail), one key element in the narrative of a person‟s life 
exits stage-right (the person herself/himself) and forever 
the person is left at the mercy of others who now solely 
re-define that person‟s essence (Sartre, 2003). We recall 
the verdict of the contemporary leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party that Mao Zedong was 70% right and 
30% wrong. Hayward‟s turn to Christianity can be seen 
as his way of rejecting the value judgements being 
placed upon him by Australian society.  Hayward prefers 
to allow his omnipotent and omnipresent God to define 
him. Each of Hayward‟s three life-stages seems to be 
characterised by authentic choices and by an 
existentialist desire to create and re-create his own 
essence through these choices. As Sartre (2003) makes 
clear, transcendence and continual re-creation of one‟s 
essence always remains possible. This existentialist 
message I imagine would be positively received by some 
people serving jail time for tax or accounting fraud.   
   How can a living existentialist philosophy be used to 
inform the teaching and management of an Accounting 
Theory or similar course? The existentialism which I 
would like to consider is that of Sartre (for example, 2003, 
2004) and Simone de Beauvoir (for example, 2004). This 
is the idea that “existence precedes essence” or that, 
because there is no pre-ordained purpose in human 
existence, we need to courageously create our own 
essence through our choices and actions. This 
existentialism, although atheistic in Sartre‟s hands, does 
not need to be. Some say the father of existentialism was 
the 19
th
 century Danish theologian and philosopher Søren 
Kierkegaard, a devout Christian, whilst other authors 
trace existentialism back to themes developed by early 
Christian writers St Augustine (354-430) and Blaise 
Pascal (1623-1662).  Pascal (1995) spoke of the 
desperation and loneliness of a human being cast alone 
into a vast universe at a time and a place not of her/his 
choosing. He then put forward his famous “wager” where 
he argued that a human being should seek God because 
the payoff if Christianity was true was greater than the 
loss if Christianity was not true. Pascal also put forward 
his existentialist view that we are not free not to choose to 
make the wager. French philosopher Simone Weil‟s hard 
and painful personal journey which took her to the verge 
of the Roman Catholic Church, but which prevented her 
from formally entering it, can be viewed in similar  
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existentialist terms. Both Simone Weil and Deng Xiaoping 
were in Paris in the 1920s and both worked for a short 
time in manufacturing plants in the city. These events led 
to both becoming further entrenched in their sincere 
pursuits of Marxist-Leninist ideals.   
   The universities of the West, as part of Foucault‟s 
(1977, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c) confessing, disciplining, 
and normalizing “carceral city”, can be intimidating places 
for working-class and ethnic minority students since 
aristocratic and bourgeois values are assumed and 
exalted. Free market ideologies run rampant and largely 
unopposed in business schools and in economics and 
accounting departments. Marx and Engels are either 
forgotten or despised while Adam Smith, Irving Fisher, 
Milton Friedman, Hayek, Ball & Brown and Watts & 
Zimmerman are championed.  Even John Maynard 
Keynes is out of favour among the neo-liberals of today 
for reasons related to Keynes‟s doubts as to the 
permanence of economic booms and the Keynesian 
tenet of state intervention in the economy to maintain full 
employment. A similar bourgeois culture permeates the 
Big-4 or Fat-4 accounting firms whose employment 
application forms, it has been argued, discriminate 
against working-class applicants (Jacobs, 2003). 
Accounting firms have a culture of old-school-tie and 
bourgeois values and the extant hegemonic capitalist 
culture tends to be accepted and reproduced without 
question (Kim, 2004a, 2004b) (Prior to the 1980s 
accounting firms used the old school network as evidence 
of Catholicism. Evidently, religious kinship had become a 
virtue in itself). The modern employer and university 
emphasis on “generic skills” and “graduate attributes” has 
failed to help matters since the ability to accrue and 
exercise these skills and attributes is a direct function of 
bourgeois sub-cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1979, 1993; 
Kahn-Harris, 2007; Thornton, 1995). Access to money, 
transport and sub-cultural social skills are all needed to 
pursue successfully the activities which are commonly 
believed to create generic skills (for example, presidency 
and membership of university and community academic, 
sporting, and social clubs). Some students are better able 
to participate in such activities than others due to family 
background, social class, ethnicity and schooling. Some 
are just too busy working at either part-time or full-time 
jobs. Given the above, an accounting educator who has 
sympathy for working class and ethnic minority students 
can do a lot to present to them and to her/his colleagues 
an alternative vision of the world and to “bring to social 
consciousness” (Dillard and Tinker, 1996) the problems 
and contradictions of free-market logic. As Dillard and 
Tinker (1996, p. 222, emphasis added) write: “[O]ne 
purpose of critical accounting is to … bring structural 
contradictions into consciousness and develop them to 
their highest level of instability”.   
 
Existentialist philosophy explored  
This section more fully explores the existentialist 
 
 
 
 
philosophy of Nietzsche, Sartre and de Beauvoir.  
Existentialist song lyrics by influential “first wave of punk” 
band The Clash, once described as “the only band that 
mattered”, are also considered. The songs studied are 
“London Calling” (1979) and “Stay Free” (1978). I explore 
these authors‟ and artists‟ at times conflicting and at 
times complementary views and perspectives and then 
sift through the material to construct our own existentialist 
values. In Section 3, I move on to consider how this 
philosophy and ethics can be used to create and manage 
an Accounting Theory course in such a way that it reflects 
our philosophy and ethics without unduly irritating those 
with divergent views. 
I shall start with Nietzsche. Nietzsche‟s existentialism is 
probably best encapsulated in his late-period polemical 
works Beyond Good and Evil (1973), Twilight of the Idols 
(1990), and The Anti-Christ (1990) although a calmer and 
more balanced perspective can be found in his mid-
period work Human, All Too Human (1994). In Beyond 
Good and Evil (1973), building on insights from his earlier 
work, he argues that only the aristocratic and the strong 
have the ability and courage to create their own values 
through their actions. The aristocracy maintains what 
Nietzsche calls “master-moralities”. By contrast the weak-
willed herds merely invert master-moralities to create 
“slave-moralities”. The weak are aided by Christianity 
(and/or by Socialism) since the Christian religion inverts 
the strong‟s values. Instead of exalting strength and 
power, it makes virtues of meekness, obedience, 
submission, humility, etc. This is the perfect answer to the 
ressentiment (resentment) of the herd since the herd 
wants to exact its revenge upon the aristocracy and upon 
the strong because of its jealousy and covetousness. 
However, Nietzsche (1994) does acknowledge that 
weakness on occasion is beneficial since it may mean an 
enhanced ability to adapt.   
For Nietzsche (1973, 1990), Christianity is the perfect 
vehicle for the herd since it both exalts virtues of 
weakness (which members of the herd support since they 
are weak already) whilst referring continually to the day 
when the Kingdom of God will come and wreck its 
revenge in the form of divine justice. The herd are, in 
Nietzsche‟s words in On the Genealogy of Morals, 
“ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical 
revaluation of their enemies‟ values, that is to say, an act 
of the most spiritual revenge” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 121, 
emphasis original). Socialism is likewise a tool by which 
the weak herd, through referring to slave morality 
ideologies such as the equality and brotherhood of man, 
is able to comfort those who lack the will and power to 
rule. As Nietzsche writes in Twilight of the Idols (1990, 
Section 34), socialists place their ressentiment upon 
society whereas Christians largely place it upon 
themselves. Ultimately, Nietzsche believes that everyone 
is motivated by the sublimated will to power. In the 
following Section 451 from Human, All Too Human (1994, 
p. 216), Nietzsche argues that the members of the ruling  
  
 
 
 
 
elite who propagate socialism may do so in the interests 
of justice whereas those of the herd who propagate it can 
be only motivated by covetousness: 
 
“Justice as a party‟s lure. Noble (if not exactly very 
insightful) representatives of the ruling class may very 
well vow to treat people as equals, and grant them equal 
rights. To that extent, a socialistic way of thought, based 
on justice, is possible; but, as we said, only within the 
ruling class, which in this case practices justice by its 
sacrifices and renunciations. On the other hand, to 
demand equality of rights, as do the socialists of the 
subjugated caste, never results from justice but rather 
covetousness. 
 
“If one shows the beast bloody pieces of meat close by, 
and then draws them away until it finally roars, do you 
think this roar means justice?” (Emphasis original). 
 
Nietzsche (2004) suggests here that we do not accept at 
face value that people are motivated completely by noble 
and selfless motives. In fact, often people‟s motives are 
mixed and confused and often even not completely 
known to themselves. A person who, on the supposed 
grounds of justice, lobbies people aggressively and with 
determination for her/his own personal circumstances to 
be improved but cares little for the circumstances of 
others (especially after her/his own circumstances are no 
longer as bad as they were) may have been motivated 
originally, at least in part, by covetousness. A trivial 
example here would be the university student who scores 
75% on an assessment item and then launches a 
vociferous appeal against the assigned score on “justice” 
grounds. “Surely, he doth protest too much”.             
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche (1973) claims that 
the strong are all philosophers since for him philosophy is 
simply choosing our own values through action. The new 
philosophers of Beyond Good and Evil are essentially the 
same people as the free spirits of Human, All Too Human 
(1994) and the immoralists of Twilight of the Idols (1990). 
Nietzsche eagerly awaits the rising of the new 
philosophers of whom he is one. These new philosophers 
will courageously create their own values through action 
whilst being strong enough in mind to reject the tempting 
herd ideologies of the weak and the resentful (primarily 
Christianity and Socialism). The new philosophers will 
inhabit that free realm which lies beyond or above good 
and evil (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 1990). The 
black-metal music scene, known originally for church-
burning and murder in Norway in the early-1990s, has 
adopted much of Nietzsche‟s worldview at times 
acknowledging him by name (see Moynihan and 
Søderlind, 2003).   
Clearly Nietzsche is an existentialist thinker. He argues 
that modern thinking and Christianity have artificially 
separated out the doer from the deed in such a way to 
imply that the strong can choose not to be strong and the  
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weak can choose not to be weak.  Expressed in these 
terms I can understand Nietzsche‟s rejection of the free-
will doctrine. “Free-will” to Nietzsche is a displeasing idea 
since he takes the term to mean “ability and willingness to 
act contrary to one‟s nature which is either strong or 
weak”. For Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals 
(2004, p. 133) “the deed is everything”, or (in our 
preferred paraphrase, alluding to Derrida‟s “there is 
nothing but the text”) “there is nothing but the deed”.  
Towards the end of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche 
(1973) argues that in Ancient Greece (his heroes include 
not only Napoleon and Goethe but also the pre-
Socratics), human beings themselves were commented 
upon rather than their actions. However, this does not 
contradict “there is nothing but the deed”. Nietzsche 
totally deplored the separation of the evaluation of the 
person from the evaluation of her/his action after the 
manner of Jeremy Bentham‟s and John Stuart Mill‟s 
utilitarianism which he argues is designed to foist a 
particularly English form of happiness upon the world. As 
Nietzsche writes in On the Genealogy of Morals (2004, p. 
133): “But there is no such substratum; there is no „being‟ 
behind doing, effecting, becoming; „the doer‟ is merely a 
fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything”. 
Likewise, for Nietzsche, the strong and the aristocratic 
knew “as rounded men, replete with energy and therefore 
necessarily active, that happiness should not be 
sundered from action – being active was with them 
necessarily a part of happiness” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 126, 
emphasis original).   
The theory that the weak can never be anything other 
than weak or the strong anything other than strong is a 
theory that Nietzsche defends wholeheartedly for the 
most part especially as it relates to the herd. He argues 
that the herd wants the bird of prey to be held 
“accountable” for being a bird of prey which can only 
happen if it is presumed to be free to choose to act 
contrary to its natural inclinations (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 
134). However, to the present author, Nietzsche‟s 
cherished analogy of the bird of prey fails to convince. A 
bird of prey is fully driven by instincts and hence nature 
(existence) and actions (essence) will always be one and 
the same. Existence will fully precede essence and so 
existentialism does not cover this territory (Sartre, 2003, 
2004). For a thinking and reflexive human being, it can 
reasonably be argued that nature and action do not 
always coincide. A strong-willed person can choose to act 
meekly, for example, in a show of controlled strength. 
This is also the message of the Christian God on the 
cross. A reading of the evocative middle section of The 
Anti-Christ (1990), starting at around Section 29 and 
concluding around Section 41, makes it very clear that 
Nietzsche did not despise the historical Jesus and he saw 
Jesus in existentialist terms as “bequeathing mankind his 
practice [not doctrine]” (Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 1990, 
Section 35).  
It has to be admitted that there are occasions where 
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Nietzsche does regard the exercise of self-mastery and 
self-control by the strong as a positive thing (the weak 
and the working-class are not permitted this luxury), 
which is a precursor to Foucault‟s (1985, 1986) theory of 
“care of the self” in The History of Sexuality Volumes 2 
and 3. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche lists some 
advantages of religion for three groups of people: the 
rulers, those preparing to rule, and the herd. For those 
preparing to rule Nietzsche argues that religion assists in 
training in self-mastery and self-control which will be of 
use later when the opportunity to rule arrives. By contrast, 
the Christian theologian and philosopher G. K. 
Chesterton (2007, first published 1905, p. 48) claimed 
that his philosophical opponents (of whom Nietzsche was 
one although he could not reply since he passed away in 
1900) “have never understand the Cross”. If this is true of 
all of the philosophers and literary figures whom 
Chesterton (2007) reasoned with in Heretics it is most 
true of Nietzsche who labelled the cross “that ghastly 
paradox” and “that mystery of an unimaginable ultimate 
cruelty of the self-crucifixion of God for the salvation of 
man” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 123, emphasis original). 
Personally, I am won over by Nietzsche‟s “nothing but the 
deed” but fail to be convinced by the theory that the weak 
can only be weak and the strong can only be strong. This 
appears to me to be a determinism which rules out the 
possibilities of free-choice and reflexive learning. 
However, if Nietzsche is not read literally and 
mechanistically, his writings do remind us that 
institutionalized Christianity‟s influence has been subtle, 
insidious, and widespread (beginning with the first 
disciples), and that there are alternative ways of looking 
at the world including Jesus‟ own way. Nietzsche‟s call to 
actively resist herd-mentalities is refreshing when we 
consider that other herd-mentality of contemporary 
business schools, i.e. the loud proclamations of economic 
rationalism and managerialism that a manager‟s 
obligation is only to maximize the market price of her/his 
firm‟s ordinary shares.       
   The Clash‟s lyric to “London Calling” on the 1979 album 
of the same name and “Stay Free” on 1978‟s Give ‘Em 
Enough Rope album clearly reveal the existentialist 
philosophy present in the UK “first wave of punk” 
movement (1976 to 1978). I argue that a study of 
alternative counter-cultural music can provide an 
excellent window into the social totality as represented in 
the work‟s material form (James, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; 
Martin, 1998). In Martin‟s (1998) words: 
 
“Many of the most influential commentators on 
postmodernism (David Harvey and Frederic Jameson 
among them) have stuck with this privileging of individual 
artistic output as a way of mapping a social world that is 
otherwise difficult to see. Artistic output, because it 
condenses the vast scales of society into the visible 
registers of the work‟s material form, can be used to read 
the social totality” (Martin, 1998, p. 83). 
 
 
 
 
Since the working-class has now been largely integrated 
into the capitalist mainstream (Adorno, 1994; Marcuse, 
1964, 1969), counter-cultural death-metal, black-metal, 
punk, hardcore and hip-hop musicians are one of the last 
remaining voices of resistance to the status-quo and to 
the ideology of the worship of the free market. The UK‟s 
hugely influential first wave of punk was designed as a 
reaction to the out-of-touch, rich, bloated, and remote 
stadium rockers of the early 1970s such as Black 
Sabbath, Deep Purple, and Led Zeppelin as well as 
earlier heroes “Elvis, the Beatles and the Rolling Stones”. 
Whilst audiences passively worshipped their 1960s and 
early 1970s rock gods from afar, the clear ideology of 
punk, born as it was on the mean, vibrant and multi-
cultural streets of 1970s West London, was that people 
should actively participate in the music and in the 
movement. Fans were expected to actively participate at 
concerts, form their own punk bands and fanzines, and 
avoid hero-worship. The rigid distinction previously 
observed in the rock music world between bands and 
fans and the hierarchy created by that distinction were 
broken down.  The Sex Pistols‟ vocalist John Joseph 
Lydon famously proclaimed that punk was “anti-rock” and 
the 1977 punks spontaneously celebrated on hearing of 
the death of Elvis. Stellar musicianship was no longer (at 
least in theory) an essential element in being a band 
member. The Clash‟s “London Calling” lyrics proudly 
proclaim the following over the song‟s urgent and chilly 
military-style beat:  
 
“London calling to the underworld 
Come out of the cupboard, you boys and girls 
London calling, now don‟t look to us 
Phoney Beatlemania has bitten the dust”  
[www.plyrics.com]. 
 
The Beatles and Beatlemania were “phoney” and yet The 
Clash, so claims its intellectual leader, the guitarist/ 
vocalist Joe Strummer (1952-2002), was authentic. 
Furthermore, The Clash reminds us: “London calling to 
the imitation zone/ forget it, brother, you can go it alone”. 
The importance of personal experience in the first wave 
of punk scene is reflected in the later lines: “Yes, I was 
there, too/ and you know what they said? Well, some of it 
was true!” The last line here can be read as a being a 
deliberate mocking of those who might later want to come 
along and intellectually analyse the punk movement long 
after its zenith was over. Such persons are considered 
unable to reach the same level of understanding of the 
movement‟s “truth” or essence as those who were 
actually present and who lived it in reality.        
The autobiographical song “Stay Free” (1978), written 
and sung by Clash guitarist/ vocalist Mick Jones, is a 
powerful and moving ode to same-sex friendship.  Details 
in the real-life story are factually accurate (see Gilbert, 
2004). Full lyrics of the song, as extracted from the 
dedicated punk lyrics website www.plyrics.com, 
  
 
 
 
 
are as follows: 
 
“We met when we were in school/Never took no shit from 
no one, we weren‟t fools/the teacher says we‟re 
dumb/We‟re only having fun/We piss on everyone/In the 
classroom. 
 
“When we got thrown out I left without much fuss/And 
weekends we‟d go dancing/down Streatham on the 
bus./You always made me laugh/Got me in bad 
fights/Play me pool all night/Smoking menthol. 
 
“I practised daily in my room/You were down the Crown 
planning your next move/go on a nicking spree/hit the 
wrong guy/Each of you get three/Years in Brixton. 
 
“I did my very best to write/How was Butlins?/Were the 
screws too tight?/When you lot get out/We‟re going to hit 
the town/We‟ll burn it fucking down/To a cinder. 
 
“„Cos years have passed and things have changed/And I 
move anyway I want to go/I‟ll never forget the feeling I 
got/When I heard that you‟d got home/And I‟ll never 
forget the smile on my face/„Cos I knew where you would 
be/And if you‟re in the Crown tonight/Have a drink on 
me/But go easy...step lightly...stay free [whispered part]”. 
 
The song describes the childhood days of Mick Jones 
and his close companion Robin Banks (later known as 
Robin Crocker). The reference to the nondescript satellite 
suburb of Streatham in South London points to The 
Clash‟s grim social realism. After leaving school, Jones 
and Banks‟ paths in life diverge as Jones chooses to 
devote himself to improvement as a musician and Banks 
chooses to take the path of petty crime. In the words of 
the song, “I practised daily in my room/ you were down 
the Crown [Hotel] plotting your next move”. The song 
ends with Jones hearing news that his childhood friend 
had been released from prison and he implores: “And if 
you‟re in the Crown tonight have a drink on me”. The 
poignancy and raw emotional power of the song 
increases as we realise that Jones is describing real-life 
facts and his emotions are similarly real. The authenticity 
and sincerity of Mick Jones is a major source of the 
song‟s emotional impact. Fictional characters and story 
lines would seriously have reduced the song‟s appeal to 
its punk audience in 1978 whereas for mainstream pop 
audiences it probably would have made no difference in 
regards their appreciation for the song. Being an 
existentialist and post-modern movement, punk demands 
higher levels of authenticity from its performers than does 
mainstream pop and rock. The song concludes with 
Jones‟ whispered injunction to his real-life friend: “go 
easily, step lightly, [and] stay free”. The term “stay free” is 
ambiguous here: the most literal meaning is a reference 
to Banks‟ imprisonment. However, there are additional 
existentialist overtones: Banks and the song listeners are  
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reminded to stay true to the existentialist maxim that we 
are both born free (“condemned to be free” in Sartre‟s 
words) and create ourselves through our choices. We are 
urged not to succumb to the authorities‟ views about us 
and to actively shape our own essences in the world. The 
song is existentialist to the extent that both Jones and 
Banks actively constructed their own lives through their 
choices (neither man led a passive or conformist lifestyle) 
but these choices differed and led the men to proceed 
down divergent paths.   
There is also a strong empathy-compassion element 
present in the song with Jones refusing to condemn 
Banks and re-affirming that their friendship continues into 
the present.  Whether this can rightfully be called an 
“existentialist ethics” is hard to say. It may be better 
viewed as existentialism combined with an ethic of 
working-class empathy-compassion. Clearly, however, 
the existentialism and the empathy are not seen by Jones 
as being in any way incompatible either in theory or in 
practice. Jones in fact constructs himself in part through 
the ethical and compassionate stance he adopts towards 
Banks. This was not the only choice of action he had 
available to him: he was free to disown Banks. The fact 
that Jones clearly had a choice and made a choice 
reveals his empathy-compassion to be real and powerful. 
We would be much less convinced and moved if (say) 
Banks‟ mother had re-affirmed her commitment to her 
son since family ties reduce the extent to which she can 
be said to have a true choice. I return later in this section 
to the important issue as to whether existentialism can be 
said to have its own built-in ethics or whether 
existentialism must be supplemented by ethical values 
brought in from other philosophies. Did Sartre regard 
existentialism as a “complete” philosophy?   
I now move on to Sartre. Sartre (2004), in his essay 
“Existentialism”, argues that Kant‟s “categorical 
imperative” is extremely limiting in practice because often 
an alternate course of action will satisfy the imperative 
(treat others as an end only and never as a means) as 
often as neither does. He gives the example of one of his 
students who once asked him what he should do in a 
moral dilemma in which he found himself: The student‟s 
father had been a Nazi collaborator in war-time France 
and his older brother had been killed. As his mother‟s 
only remaining child, should he stay with her in France or 
go to England to fight with the resistance against 
Germany which had an uncertain prospect of winning?  
One course of action treated his mother as an end and 
the cause as a means; for the other course of action the 
cause was an end and the mother was a means. As 
Sartre (2004) makes clear, the categorical imperative can 
give no clear-cut answer to this dilemma. Sartre‟s advice 
was for the young student to create his own future 
through his choice which, once taken, immediately 
removed the other possibility. As Nietzsche writes in 
Twilight of the Idols (1990, Section 11, emphasis 
original), “each one of us should devise his own virtue,  
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his own categorical imperative”. Although for many of us 
today would view Sartre‟s conclusion (and Nietzsche‟s) 
as unsatisfying, Sartre refuses to go beyond it. Since, for 
Sartre, the goal of human existence is to choose one‟s 
own path, he acknowledges the possibility of there being 
existentialist ethics which maintains that we should assist 
others in finding the path towards their own freedom. By 
acting we express our choice for the world. Sartre argues 
in “Existentialism” that our actions are always 
automatically and unavoidably universal ones.  It is not 
possible to say “but other people will choose different 
actions to our own so our actions are not universal”.   
The concept of “responsibility” is important for Sartre‟s 
ethics in “Existentialism”. He gives the example of an 
army commander who sends out ten or fourteen or 
twenty of his soldiers into battle, arguing that the army 
commander is responsible here for the lives and well-
being of the soldiers. This “ethics of responsibility” is 
probably closest to Foucault‟s ethics of “care of the self” 
in his late-period writings on sexuality where he argued 
that self-mastery and control of the passions were 
important ethics of “care of the self” in Ancient Greece. 
Part of the reason for this was the practical wisdom, 
found also in Nietzsche‟s (1973)  Beyond Good and Evil, 
that a person who could not rule his/her own passions 
was not fit to be entrusted with responsibility for others in 
public or political life. Importantly, Sartre‟s “ethics of 
responsibility” has no direct relationship with the 
categorical imperative. 
The concept of “bad faith”, integral to a correct 
understanding of Sartre, is discussed early on in Being 
and Nothingness (Sartre, 2003, pp. 70-94). “Bad faith”, 
because it is condemned by Sartre, could be viewed as 
being the closest that we get in Sartre‟s definitive work 
Being and Nothingness to an articulated worldview about 
what and why some actions are unethical.  “Bad faith” 
means treating oneself, part of oneself or someone else 
as an objective, reified essence rather than what Sartre 
deems as more appropriate, and that is defining oneself 
or the other exclusively in terms of past actions. Bad faith 
actions amount to a refutation of the reality that as 
humans we are “condemned to be free” or, in other 
words, that “existence precedes essence”. We must 
define our own essence through our actions in the real 
world.  This worldview alone fully acknowledges the 
reality of our human condition in this world but it involves 
courage, renunciation, loneliness, and anguish because 
we cannot hide behind conventional worldviews, the 
status quo, and the mentality of the herd. “Bad faith” 
reflects a fundamental cowardice and a fundamental 
refusal to acknowledge our true conditions of existence in 
this world. It is a form of flight to safety and security in the 
known, the mundane, the established, and the 
conventional. Sartre gives several vivid descriptions in 
Being and Nothingness of individuals that are operating 
in bad faith. As Mary Warnock (2003) explains in her 
Introduction to the Routledge Classic edition of Being and  
 
 
 
 
Nothingness, Sartre‟s stories of bad faith (to be discussed 
shortly) are not given to serve as mere examples of a 
more general principle but are intended to cause us to 
recognize, by first recognizing the existence of bad faith 
in the stories, bad faith‟s existence in the real world. In 
other words, because the stories depict bad faith, and the 
stories concern lived life, bad faith is possible as a part of 
consciousness in the present world.   
The first story appearing in Being and Nothingness is 
that of a young man and young woman who are friends 
but where the man is starting to express his designs 
towards her. The woman accepts seemingly at face value 
the man‟s statements such as “I find you very attractive” 
without letting it be known that she reads some deeper 
meanings and possibilities behind his words. She is 
delaying her moment of choice in a way that is, for Sartre, 
unacceptable as it reduces her authenticity. When the 
man takes her hand (as the character Mathieu Delarue 
does to both his mistress Marcelle and the attractive 
young Russian student Ivich in Sartre‟s (2001) novel The 
Age of Reason): without looking at his hand, she lets her 
hand remain in that position while discussing various 
trivial matters. For Sartre (2003), the woman is in bad 
faith although contemporary readers might think that the 
woman‟s actions occur every day and suggest nothing 
unacceptable. For Sartre (2003), the woman has 
objectified the man by not outwardly acknowledging the 
deeper possibilities suggested in his words. It follows that 
she then objectifies her own body by leaving his hand in 
place while simultaneously ignoring it and discussing 
other matters. The Russian student Ivich does this in The 
Age of Reason (Sartre, 2001) and confuses the 
philosophy teacher Mathieu Delarue by refusing to 
comment on his action of putting his arm around her in 
the taxi. Ivich and her brother Boris are examples of 
people living carefree but unreflexive lives while Delarue, 
a philosophy teacher at the university, is overly burdened 
by forcing himself to live consistently with existentialism. 
His over-anxious, tortured and in some ways very moral 
thoughts haunt him at every step as he fears turning into 
his brother, a married lawyer. Delarue notes that he 
(Delarue) has not gone to fight actively for freedom in the 
Spanish Civil War, nor did he join the French Communist 
Party, declining the offer to join made by his friend. 
Delarue‟s freedom consists more in not doing things and 
the freedom that he seems to enjoy most is his freedom 
to earn a fixed salary teaching at the university!  Delarue 
spends much of the novel trying to secure a cheap but 
safe abortion for Marcelle and his ethics of responsibility 
are clearly in place. The character Delarue seems to us 
to be a front for Sartre himself. Delarue‟s brother‟s words 
that his bohemianism is a sham and that he is married to 
Marcelle in all but name hit home and discourage 
Delarue; they are too close to the truth.   
The crux of bad faith is that, for the person operating in 
bad faith, facticity and transcendence are separated and 
approached only as distinct concepts. By contrast, the  
  
 
 
 
 
person operating in good faith will aim to produce a 
workable synthesis of both aspects.  Facticity refers to 
the raw facts describing the situation, in the latter 
example, the man‟s conversational lines and the hand 
upon hand. The transcendent moment will be the 
recipient‟s realization of as-yet unstated but hinted at 
possibilities. Here the existentialists would take objection 
to the arguments of the critical sociologists (for example, 
Bauman, 1976) that existentialism accepts the status quo 
in society; contra possibility is that existentialism aims to 
create new worlds not previously in existence and by so 
doing alters facticity. The woman operating in bad faith 
denies the possibility of the transcendent moment as she 
becomes aware of it. She thus maintains an artificial 
separation of the facticity and the transcendent.   
In the second bad faith story, Sartre (2003) talks of a 
young waiter who provides overly exaggerated body 
movements firstly to indicate his work ethic and prompt 
attention to customer service and secondly to emphasize 
his stately bearing as he comes out with a tray of drinks. 
There is a similar story in Sartre‟s (2001) novel The Age 
of Reason. For Sartre, the waiter is playing the game of 
being a waiter and hence is in bad faith. As Nietzsche 
writes in Twilight of the Idols (1990, Aph. 38, p. 37), “Are 
you genuine? or only an actor? A representative? or that 
itself which is represented? - Finally you are no more 
than the imitation of an actor”. Sartre‟s waiter has made 
the mistake of allowing an essence to define him and 
regulate his actions in the world. He is escaping the 
reality that he chooses to be a waiter and he could 
choose other things.   
The problems with existentialism have been discussed 
(see for example, Bauman, 1976). One problem is the 
freedom of other people which is a genuine limit to my 
freedom. Clearly existentialism works best in situations in 
which individuals confront nature - as in another example 
from Sartre of a cleft in a hill face which takes on its 
meaning (essence) as an “obstacle” to an individual‟s 
pre-existing goal to climb the cliff-face. The latter example 
illustrates a more general point that inanimate things only 
take on the form of “obstacle” in connection with a 
person‟s pre-existing goal. Pre-existing goals determine 
the structure of our world as well as our worldview. 
However, what if the obstacle is other people as many of 
our obstacles in the modern world tend to be? Sartre‟s 
theory is somewhat unsatisfactory here although he 
would claim that the unsatisfactoriness (to invent a new 
word) is simply a failing of this world in which we are 
“condemned to freedom” or “condemned to be free” 
(Sartre, 2003, p. 506). For Sartre, other people‟s freedom 
is merely viewed as a limit on one‟s own freedom. In 
other words, we are free to make choices in this world 
inhabited by others rather than in some other world. The 
nature of the world structures the rules of the game. It is 
hard to be sure what the ethical implications of this limits 
to freedom are unless an “almost Kantianism” (where  
means and ends are systematically evaluated for each 
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alternative with the decision-maker still ultimately 
“owning” the final decision) is introduced into existentialist 
philosophy in a somewhat ad-hoc manner. This is what 
Sartre‟s intellectual and romantic companion Simone de 
Beauvoir (2004) appears to do in her essay appearing in 
the same set of existentialist readings in which the 
previously mentioned Sartre essay appears.   
De Beauvoir (2004) reminds us that ethics must be 
continually re-appraised and re-negotiated in the light of 
new information. There must be a continual trading-off of 
ends against means and vice versa. Like Sartre, she 
rejects uniform and mechanistic application of the 
categorical imperative. She uses the outcry against 
Stalinism, a pressing issue at the date of writing, to 
illustrate her views. Those critics of Stalinism who point to 
repression of human liberty should not ignore the ultimate 
intended end of the Russian Communists: to create a 
more just and free society. The lynching of a black man in 
the American south is not comparable with Stalinist 
repression as the former can have no higher end in mind 
whereas the latter clearly (in de Beauvoir‟s view) does. 
Means cannot be separated from ends here. However, 
she requires Stalinists to address the question of whether 
less repression and bloodshed could have contributed 
equally to the advancement of Communist goals. In other 
words, the Stalinists should not argue that means are 
completely irrelevant in the pursuit of laudable ends. Both 
means and ends have to be traded off against one 
another and final solutions must involve a balancing of 
ends and means. The choice with better ends should be 
chosen if means are similar. The better less costly in 
terms of human suffering means should be selected to 
pursue a pre-existing end. De Beauvoir is of the view that 
no revolution has occurred without a little bloodshed so 
for her the relevant question is really “how much 
bloodshed is acceptable?” Her other example is two 
cases involving trading off improving the immediate lot of 
a few individual workers and advancing the cause of the 
Communists in a subjective and hard-to-quantify way. In 
one situation, she favoured aiding the individual workers 
since this was near at hand and the future prospect of 
advancing the communist cause was subjective and 
remote. By contrast, in a similar case with slightly 
different circumstances, she favours the other cause of 
action. Both sets of ends in both situations can be viewed 
as desired but it is the relative interplay of means and 
ends which is the decisive factor in both cases. Means 
are constantly re-evaluated in the light of their 
relationships with ends.   
The editor (Gordon Marino) of the set of existentialist 
readings that contains de Beauvoir‟s essay, Basic 
Writings of Existentialism, views this chapter of de 
Beauvoir (2004) as being “almost Kantian” ethics. Clearly 
it is not purely Kantian as a complex and dialectical 
evaluation of the inter-play between means and ends if 
certain actions are undertaken is recommended. 
However, the editor appears correct to label the views  
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“almost Kantian” since the essay appears to go “beyond 
Sartre” and introduce to existentialism ad-hoc Kantian 
“improvements” that do not appear to be part of the 
original existentialism template (although they may be 
desired on other grounds). In other words, de Beauvoir‟s 
ethics are clearly an ethics (and probably a very good 
one at that) but they are not so obviously an existentialist 
ethics. As an example to illustrate our point, a 
professional football club may require a police clearance 
before staff can work with children but this is not clearly a 
“football club ethics” as opposed to being simply an 
ethics. Once the freedoms of people (neither acting in 
bad faith nor in a way that is obviously oppressive) come 
into conflict, we must resort to an ethics from outside 
existentialism. This is why Sartre was so reluctant to 
advise his student as to which course of action he should 
undertake (i.e. stay with his mother in France or go to 
England and train with the resistance). That question is 
not in that context an existentialist question. Both 
possible choices would involve creating oneself by one‟s 
actions and neither appears to reveal bad faith. For 
Sartre there can be no existentialist ethics other than the 
distinction between good and bad faith. If we look at de 
Beauvoir‟s example of Stalinist repression, there is not a 
clear “ethical” answer based on existentialist ethics alone 
since Comrade Stalin and his critics (including Leon 
Trotsky) both had their own pre-existing goals that simply 
were incompatible. What was a limit to freedom for Stalin 
(although he surmounted it by jailing and murdering 
dissidents) was a freedom for his critics and vice versa. 
While means/ends analysis can offer much insight, it is 
not clear that yielding to some of the prescriptions that 
appear to follow from some of the insights can allow us to 
remain exclusively within existentialist philosophy as it 
was conceived by Sartre. Repressing dissidents, if we 
stay within the confines of existentialism, cannot be 
unethical for Stalin unless Stalin was reifying himself or 
others by that action. Or was it simply a case of pre-
existing goals being in conflict? Pre-existing goals clearly 
can be in conflict where neither party is operating in bad 
faith. An example would be a man wanting to expand his 
farm buildings to improve his income and the government 
wanting to re-possess the entire farm in order to construct 
a freeway. A second example would be the victorious 
Chinese Communists in the 1950s wanting to acquire 
assets to set up a Communist state and landowners 
naturally wanting to hold on to their own land in order to 
pursue pre-existing private goals. This second example 
would only have a clear existentialist solution if, for 
example, a man wanted to hoard land so as to define 
himself in his own mind and that of others as part of a 
land-owning aristocracy. Such a man clearly for Sartre 
would be acting in bad faith and, according to 
existentialist ethics, the Communists would have had 
sound reasons for opposing his desires.  
Another important Nietzschean concept is that of “bad 
conscience” as outlined in Beyond Good and Evil  
 
 
 
 
(1973). The idea of bad conscience is that modern 
European man, whilst becoming weak and adhering 
slavishly to the false ideology of inverted values, has 
become trapped into an attitude of excessive 
introspection, navel-gazing, self-loathing, and self-hatred. 
A definition of “bad conscience” is found in On the 
Genealogy of Morals as follows: “This instinct for freedom 
forcibly made latent – we have seen it already – this 
instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed, 
incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent 
itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad 
conscience is in its beginnings” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 177, 
emphasis original). This seems to anticipate to some 
degree the mid twentieth century Freudian-Marxism of 
Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) and Herbert Marcuse 
(1898-1979). According to Nietzsche, institutionalized 
Christianity arose in response to such needs to self-loath 
whilst further justifying it and entrapping those who might 
want to be free. As Nietzsche writes in On the Genealogy 
of Morals: 
  
“He apprehends in „God‟ the ultimate antithesis of his own 
ineluctable animal instincts; he reinterprets these animal 
instincts themselves as a form of guilt before God [for 
Kierkegaard, this is exactly what the instinctual is] (as 
hostility, rebellion, insurrection against the „Lord‟, the 
„father‟, the primal ancestor and origin of the world); … 
his will [is] to erect an ideal – that of the „holy God‟ – and 
in the face of it to feel the palpable certainty of his own 
absolute unworthiness” (Nietzsche, 2004, pp. 182-183, 
emphasis original).   
 
Before we go on to consider practical implications in 
Sections 3 and 4, it is worth pausing to consider 
Bauman‟s (1976) objection to existentialism grounded in 
critical sociology. For Bauman, existentialism is only ever 
partial, as Durkheim and Parsons‟ functional sociology is 
only ever partial. Bauman (1976) writes that in 
existentialist philosophy, the outside world of other and 
society is forever fixed – it is a limit to freedom caused by 
others exercising their freedoms. By contrast, in the 
Frankfurt School‟s neo-Marxian critical sociology, the 
thesis and anti-thesis are involved in a process of 
dynamic struggle; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are 
engaged in continuous action upon each other so that 
each one is simultaneously subject and object. The 
actual outcomes are the results of a contingent historical 
process.  Bauman claims that because existentialism 
assumes that the other is fixed and immutable, it cannot 
be a complete philosophy. Bauman (1976) argues that 
while in contemplation of a single act, society may be 
viewed as fixed, in regards to a series of acts that is not 
the case as each act in the series has a consequence 
and changes the present including people‟s 
consciousness of the present. After one act, the world is 
forever changed.  However, a close reading of Being and 
Nothingness reveals that for Sartre (2003) one act does  
  
 
 
 
 
forever change the world so for Sartre making a person 
immortal would not reduce the validity of choice in the 
present since “the moment” can never be re-captured nor 
“the stars aligned” in exactly the same way. Sartre‟s 
(2003) goal is to provide people with a philosophy that 
can assist them in the present where it may not be 
unreasonable in most cases to view society as fixed. The 
popular adage, often incorporated into the home-spun 
wisdom of football coaches, of “control what you can 
control; don‟t worry about what you can‟t control” is 
clearly Sartrean.  Warnock (2003) claims that 
existentialism was never intended to be philosophy that 
was complete within itself. It could be supplemented with 
other philosophies as Sartre attempted to do by adding 
Marxism to his mix. While existentialism encourages 
people to choose goals it does not tell them what those 
goals should be. However, Sartre (2003) also is careful 
not to rely on the actions of others in the present or the 
future. He states that there is no reason why advancing 
Marxist causes cannot be a person‟s goal but that person 
would be deluded if she/he buys into the utopian dream 
that people will continue to fight to advance the Marxist 
cause in remote parts of the world and/or after her/his 
own death: for Sartre all these things outside a person‟s 
direct control should not be presumed upon. As Trotsky 
(2004, first published 1937) laments in The Revolution 
Betrayed, the authors of the Russian Revolution, himself 
included, acted upon a presumption that proletariat 
revolutions would occur quickly in other European 
countries. Stalin in a sense was more existentialist than 
Trotsky since he refused to depend upon events outside 
of his and his Party‟s direct control. Stalin‟s official 
doctrine of “socialism in one country” infuriated Trotsky 
and the Trotskyites because of its practicality and its 
reflection of Stalin‟s complete determination to pursue his 
own goals independently of what others might do. In 
general, the critical sociologists and the existentialists 
both have a point. If existentialism is not regarded as a 
complete philosophy in itself then the objections of critical 
sociologists disappear. Whether the actions of others 
should be presumed upon remains probably the main 
bone of contention between the two schools of thought.  
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATORS 
The author’s experiences 
How can existentialism inform the teaching and 
management of a third-year undergraduate Accounting 
Theory class? In general terms, it means that the 
educator puts the emphasis back on encouraging 
students to be creative, to take risks, and to break rules 
and established academic and social conventions in their 
research and essay writing. (“You want to cite Wikipedia 
in your essay although your prior lecturers consistently 
and without exception told you not to?  Go ahead and cite 
it although don‟t cite Wikipedia alone.”) A wide variety of 
choices are built into our course‟s assessment items to 
provide full opportunity for students to take control 
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over their own researching, reading and essay writing 
activities and so to create themselves. In the two-hour 
Accounting Theory final exam I used last year at my rural 
Australian “new university” (counting for 70% of the final 
grade), students had a choice of four out of nine essay 
questions. There was one question on each module with 
the exception of the Ethics module which had two 
questions. Choice for students and therefore the ability to 
create oneself was maximized. Students could study only 
three modules (three weeks of work) and still be able to 
answer the entire exam.  Clearly this benefits especially 
those students working part-time or full-time and those 
with heavy family commitments. Our university has a high 
percentage of external students who are mostly mature-
aged and who mostly work full-time. In the major 
assignment for 2007 (counting for 25% of the final grade), 
students could select any one of the ten modules studied 
in the course and discuss it within the context of the 
question: “Critically evaluate the usefulness of Accounting 
Theory for practising accountants today” (This question 
was originally used by Dr Graeme Rose in his Accounting 
Theory course at Albury campus of Charles Sturt 
University and I thank Graeme for his permission to use it 
when I taught the same course at the Wagga Wagga 
campus of Charles Sturt University in 2005-06). Students 
could choose the same module for assignment and exam 
this allowing them to create and define themselves (with 
“existence preceding essence”; Sartre, 2003, p. 490) as 
“expert” in one module area. In the past two years the 
major assignment question has been specifically on 
existentialism. Existentialism is either studied directly or 
via study of the lyrics of rock band Metallica which are 
commonly perceived to be existentialist (James and 
Tolliday, 2009). The two options for the major assignment 
in Semester 2 of 2010 were as follows:  
 
Option (a)  
“Provide an existentialist analysis of the following 
Metallica songs (Google for the lyrics): Damage Inc, The 
Unforgiven, Nothing Else Matters, Mama Said. Relate the 
lyrics to vocalist James Hetfield‟s personal journey of self 
re-creation after his upbringing in a strict Christian 
Science family. Do you think existentialist ethics may be 
useful for an understanding of your own life and career 
journey and for the accounting profession?” 
 
Option (b) 
“Explain the key points of Jean-Paul Sartre‟s (1905-1980) 
existentialist philosophy.  Your discussion must include 
reference to the concept of „bad faith‟, and explain 
carefully between „being-in-itself‟, „being-for-itself‟ and 
„being-for-others‟. Do you think existentialist ethics may 
be useful for an understanding of your own life and 
career journey and for the accounting profession?” 
    
Exam markers are instructed to do all they can to bring 
students up to a Pass grade (but grades above 65% are  
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much harder to achieve) so as to remove from students‟ 
anxious minds the fear of failure. My experience is that 
fear of failing is a huge concern for students and that the 
mental burden students carry with them each semester 
connected with this fear saps energy and creativity thus 
helping to bring about what they fear most. In Sartre‟s 
(2001) novel The Age of Reason, the beautiful Russian 
student Ivich is tormented even in the nightclubs and bars 
of Paris by the fear of failing exams which for her would 
have meant banishment to her father‟s steel works in the 
French provinces, an environment that for her represents 
the stifling of all freedom and future. I myself saw the 
power of the university graders‟ pens when the young 
undergraduate student I shared a house with in Wagga 
Wagga in regional New South Wales, Australia in 2005 
failed all his courses. One day the huge Blink 182 (punk 
rock band) poster that once proudly adorned his bedroom 
wall had been hastily removed from his now empty 
bedroom. After hearing his results the student had 
disappeared and the once extroverted and cheerful 
young man had been too ashamed to even formally 
farewell his housemates. Removing fear of failure through 
wide choice of assignment and exam questions and 
generous marking should provide an added boost to 
creativity since, as Nietzsche would most certainly agree, 
scared and nervous students rarely can produce high 
quality and creative work.   
In the author‟s Accounting Theory course, students are 
encouraged and empowered to create their own insights, 
ideas and conclusions based on the raw materials 
provided by the instructor and on the Reading List. The 
student is effectively encouraged to choose and create 
her/his own course and own learning experience and 
hence choose and create herself/himself.  As the narrator 
in The Clash‟s 1978 song “Julie‟s been working for the 
Drug squad” grants former street punk Julie the right to 
re-create her own essence as a now successful member 
of the Drug Squad, let us grant our students total freedom 
to totally re-create their own essences during the thirteen 
weeks of the current semester. Student critiques of power 
relations and speaking out against injustice and 
oppression are encouraged and rewarded as the 
educator adopts a clear Critical Theory inspired ethical 
perspective for the course. The third assignment option, 
first introduced for Semester 1 of 2011, uses the Jack the 
Ripper murders that took place in Whitechapel and 
Spitalfields, East London, in the autumn of 1888 as a 
window to understand the transition (as Marx and Engels 
explained it) from feudalism to capitalism which meant 
the creation of a huge proletariat and lumpenproletariat in 
the cities in areas such as Whitechapel for the first time in 
human history. The third major assignment option for 
Semester 1 of 2011 is reproduced here: 
 
“Briefly outline the facts in the “Jack-the-Ripper” murder 
case that took place in Whitechapel, East London, in the 
autumn of 1888. Use Marxist economic theory to locate  
 
 
 
 
the case setting within the context of the beginnings of 
global capitalism and the emergence of an urban 
proletariat (working-class) for the first time in history. Did 
capitalism really kill the women?”  
 
Students are rewarded for referencing Marx‟s theories of 
alienation and dialectical materialism in addressing this 
question. For Nietzsche, there is nothing but the deed” 
and while that is an extreme position, by and large I 
accept it. However, it needs to be balanced with 
compassion and empathy. Nietzsche‟s (2004) thesis that 
“there is nothing but the deed” is welcomed in the sense 
that it means that we must never pre-judge any student 
either in terms of her/his ability, expected performance 
level or presumed character. This would be reifying 
essence and hence a clear act of bad faith. How easy is it 
to pre-judge “ability” especially for higher-degree students 
whose ability we presume is both fixed and known fully by 
us? I was a member of an honours class at a prestigious 
research-intensive G8 university in Australia close to 20 
years ago where there were six full-time students and the 
two perceived least brilliant students, myself being one, 
were doomed to lower second class honours even before 
a ball had been kicked in anger. Instructors had a 
hierarchy of essences fixed in their minds before, to use 
another sporting metaphor, a ball had been bowled. 
Students who perform at standard X in first year can 
easily jump several standards or fall several standards in 
the following years due to personal and family problems, 
work pressures, enjoyment of the course, instructor, tutor, 
God‟s unpredictable grace, the religious impulse 
(McKernan and Kosmala, 2007)  etc. If we are educators 
informed and inspired by existentialism we will refuse to 
pre-judge any student‟s ability, expected performance or 
character; we will not take into account such elitist factors 
as a student‟s accent, dress style, family connections, 
parental income, parental occupation, friendship 
networks, secondary school attended, etc.  Class 
reproduction probably is just a fact of life (Bourdieu, 
1979, 1993) but we must do our best to ensure that we 
upset this apple-cart as much as possible rather than 
playing into its hands. Let no judgement ever be made 
regarding essences until the facts of action reveal 
themselves to us. 
How often have we defined ourselves in the world as 
“accounting lecturer” and our students as “accounting 
students” and “future accountants”? We are ruled by 
reified essences.  Our reified essence is that of the 
CPA/chartered accountant rather than the accountant 
working in industry even though the latter are much more 
numerous. Most ethics education in tertiary accounting 
classes is of marginal usefulness, since as Boyce (2008), 
James (2009a, 2009b) and McPhail (1999) have argued, 
it reifies and deifies the atomistic “role” and presumed 
professional characteristics of “the accountant”. This is 
completely unhelpful since our true nature is as human 
beings in the world and not as “accountants” (treated as a  
  
 
 
 
 
0/1 binary variable at any point in time). If we think our 
identity is accountant in essence then we will wrack our 
minds trying to figure out exactly what an accountant is 
and how one should act and be left without definite 
answers on either score. We are reminded of Sartre‟s 
young waiter. If “Dad” is an accountant we will think that 
to be an accountant means to be “like Dad”. If Sarah is 
an accountant to be an accountant might mean to be like 
Sarah. If we don‟t know any real-life accountants then we 
are in major trouble. How can young people hope to act 
like an “accountant” if they do not know who they are as 
human beings yet? Our critical accounting education 
should help students to discover and to create 
themselves as authentic human beings in the world rather 
than as “accountant” essences. Despite the push for 
tertiary education to deliver narrowly defined economic 
outcomes to students, we view it as “weird” and 
inauthentic to define oneself by a bunch of transferable, 
technical skills as might be contained in a job description 
or as an essence such as “accountant” or “CPA” in CPA 
or Big-4/ Fat-4 promotional literature. Don‟t most people 
advise you before job interviews to “just be yourself?” 
With our glossy business school promotional brochures of 
young accountants in expensive new office gear, are we 
ultimately doing our students a disservice by implying that 
you can‟t just “come as you are”? If you can‟t just “come 
as you are”, your prior socialization experiences, 
including ethical values, from your family, schools, and 
community groups may be perceived as just as irrelevant. 
Existentialist philosophy can provide the soon-to-be 
accountant with a way forward and provide a 
philosophical grounding for the everyday phrase “just be 
yourself” (although that should be modified to “just create 
yourself”). 
Ethics in the Kantian form of duties and obligations 
have been inferred and derived from the accountant‟s 
perceived role, a clear case of essence preceding 
existence. How should “the accountant” act in dilemma 
X? What does the accounting profession‟s Joint Code of 
Professional Conduct say that “the accountant” should do 
or not do in Situation Z? Isn‟t this a sure recipe for serious 
depression if a person loses one‟s job and finds that as 
consequence one‟s essence has been vaporized? I knew 
someone whose father retired as Asia area Marketing 
Manager for an MNC. He still defined himself in that role 
years after his retirement. It became more and more sad 
and ridiculous and he became more and more angry and 
strange as the years passed. It only took a year or two for 
his former colleagues to forget him as people and the 
corporation had moved on. The plaque from the company 
thanking him for his years of service still occupied prime 
position on his study wall. Only by sleeping all day and 
drinking Guinness Stout all night (in the quiet hours) 
could he semi-convince himself that he was still an 
important person and that life was still as it had always 
been. It was Ivan Ilyich in Count Leo Tolstoy‟s (2008) 
famous short story The Death of Ivan Ilyich all over again.  
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Similarly, if one is no longer an “accountant”, the Joint 
Code of Professional Conduct clearly does not apply and 
one becomes a “nothing” in that world. By focusing on the 
ethical duties of “the accountant” we also run the risk that 
students will continue to separate the “accounting” part of 
their life from the “other” parts of their lives (Boyce, 2008; 
James, 2009a, 2009b; McPhail, 1999) and, quite 
possibly, use different ethical reasoning in each part. Why 
would anyone ever want to retire if it is only her/his life as 
“accountant” that represents value and has become the 
exclusive subject of the lifeworld? To emancipate 
student/teacher relations, should not the focus be how we 
can as human beings whose existence precedes our 
essence choose to act in the world and how this then 
may potentially impact our job, our home, our friends, our 
community, etc.? We see ourselves as educators of 
human beings not of “future accountants”. Is it any 
wonder that Friends was such a popular TV show since in 
that program a group of young twenty-something New 
Yorkers constantly re-define and re-position themselves 
within their circle of friends by their actions alone? Will 
the world be improved even if accountants start to act 
more ethically if our communities are threatened by racial 
violence, ideological violence and climate change? 
Sartre‟s young waiter story about the young man playing 
at the game of being a waiter seems to hold much 
contemporary relevance for accounting educators. My 
message is not altogether a comforting one: I refuse to 
allow educators to hide behind the safe and comforting 
essence of “accounting lecturer” or allow my students to 
hide behind the safe and comforting essences of 
“accounting student and future accountant”. 
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